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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 10-2813, 10-2992, and 11-1142 
_____________ 
 
*JOC INC., t/a SUMMIT EXXON; 
SUNG EEL CHANG AUTO, INC., t/a ASHWOOD EXXON  
 
 v. 
 
 EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP.; 
EXXON MOBIL CORP. 
 
ExxonMobil Oil Corp. Appellant in Nos. 10-2813 and 11-1142 
Sung Eel Chang Auto, Inc., t/a Ashwood Exxon Appellant in No. 10-2992 
 
* Dismissed pursuant to Court Order entered January 17, 2012 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 2-08-cv-05344) 
District Judge: Stanley R. Chesler 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 18, 2012 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, and VANASKIE  Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 19, 2012)  
_____________            
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
The ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (“Exxon”) and Sung Eel Chang Auto, Inc., t/a 
Ashwood Exxon (“Ashwood”),1 cross-appeal from a District Court preliminary 
injunction that barred Exxon from terminating the Ashwood franchise for certain reasons.  
Because the franchise no longer exists, there is no live controversy before us and we will 
dismiss the appeals as moot.  
I. Background 
We write primarily for the parties and recount only the essential facts.  The three 
consolidated appeals in this case concern the former Ashwood Exxon gas station, which 
led a troubled existence as an Exxon franchise from 1996 until 2011.  As a franchisee, 
Ashwood leased its property from Exxon and was obligated to purchase its gasoline from 
Exxon.  In 2008 Ashwood filed suit against Exxon in New Jersey state court, alleging 
that Exxon charged it higher wholesale rates for gasoline than it charged competing 
stations, and that the divergent pricing violated New Jersey law.  Exxon argued that its 
pricing was lawful and that Ashwood’s own business practices were the cause of its 
financial distress.   The suit was removed to federal court on the grounds of diversity of 
citizenship.   
                                              
1
 Ashwood is the sole remaining plaintiff in the underlying action.  The second original 
plaintiff, JOC, Inc. t/a Summit Exxon, settled with Exxon and withdrew while these 
appeals were pending.   
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In 2009, Ashwood stopped paying rent.  Exxon commenced proceedings to 
terminate the franchise, and Ashwood moved for a preliminary injunction to bar 
termination while the lawsuit was ongoing.
2
  Between May and December of 2010 the 
District Court issued three orders that, in combination, partially granted and partially 
denied the injunction.  Their final effect was to bar Exxon from terminating the franchise 
on the basis of Ashwood’s contractual violations prior to December 2010.  The District 
Court declined, however, to prohibit Exxon from terminating the franchise on any new 
ground that might arise.   Exxon appealed the partial bar, and Ashwood cross-appealed 
the denial of a broader injunction.
3
   
 After the appeals were filed, Exxon terminated the Ashwood franchise, effective 
May 2011, on the basis of Ashwood’s new violations of its contractual obligations.  
Ashwood was evicted from the station premises in January 2012.
4
   
 
                                              
2
 Prior to the preliminary injunction, the parties conducted settlement negotiations and 
litigated a motion to dismiss.  See JOC, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 2010 WL 1380750 
(D.N.J. April 1, 2010) (partially granting and partially denying Exxon’s motion).  
Ashwood filed an Amended Complaint after the District Court issued its opinion.   
  
3
 As docketed, No. 10-2813 is Exxon’s appeal of the May 18 and June 4 injunction 
orders, No. 10-2992 is Ashwood’s cross-appeal from the June 4 order, and No. 11-1142 
is Exxon’s appeal of the December 13 order. 
 
4
 Exxon provided these facts in response to an inquiry from this court directing the parties 
to address whether the Ashwood franchise continued to exist and, if not, whether the 
appeals of the District Court’s interlocutory orders were moot.  See In re Cantwell, 639 
F.2d 1050, 1054 n.4 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[F]acts bearing on the issue of mootness can be 
raised at any time during the judicial proceedings.”).  Ashwood did not respond to the 
court’s inquiry.  We therefore take the facts to be uncontested.  
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II. Analysis 
We have jurisdiction to review orders of the District Court granting or denying a 
preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006), but “[w]e do not have 
jurisdiction to hear a case that cannot affect the rights the appellant wishes to assert.”  
Salovaara v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 2001) (per curiam).  
“The mootness doctrine is centrally concerned with the court's ability to grant effective 
relief.”  Cnty. of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 2001).  “[I]f 
an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court 
to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed 
[as moot].”  Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
In appealing the partial preliminary injunction, Exxon sought the right to terminate 
the Ashwood franchise, and Ashwood sought to prevent termination.  The franchise no 
longer exists.  Even if Exxon had not terminated it, Ashwood’s franchise contract would 
have expired in February 2012.  Because there is no longer any franchise to terminate or 
to save, we cannot grant either party effective relief.   
The appeals are accordingly dismissed as moot.
5
 
                                              
5
 There is no need to vacate the underlying orders, as United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 
340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950), requires of final judgments when appeals become moot.  “[I]t 
is sufficient to dismiss the appeal without directing that the injunction order be vacated.”  
13C Charles A. Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10.3 (3d ed. 
2012).  Accord Nelson v. Quick Bear Quiver, 546 U.S. 1085, 1085 (2006); Clark v. K-
Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).   Although the injunction is 
moot, the dispute between the parties remains unresolved.  We express no opinion as to 
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whether Ashwood has a viable claim for damages from Exxon, an issue not raised in the 
appeal before us. 
